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0 This little case presents one question: whether the installations 
!? of~a pen register constitutes a "search" for purposes of the 4th Amencln 
' 2. 
.. 
ment, such that a warrant for its .installation is required. Everyone a ~· 
seems to agree that Katz· governs the case, and that Justice Harlan's 
two-pronged inquiry· is appropriate: first, did petr have·· an actual 
s, 
g. 
"' ~ 
(subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, if he did, is societ;iJ. 
prepared to recognize that expectation• (objectively) as1 reasonable? ~ 
~ The parties disagree only as to how these questions should be answere·: !!: 
0 
,= 
as to pen registers. 
The case seems quite easy to me, f I conclude that telephone useq 
in general probably do !!2J:. 
the numbers they dial into 
s, 
entertain any expectation of"privacy• as to Q 
" the national telephone network; and that, ~ 
"' 
even if users do have some expectation of privacy, this expectation is 
I not "reasonable." Hence, the installation of a pen register is· not a 
"search" and no warrant is required. 
/ 
_/'" 
•' / 
// 
,g' 
I, FACTS a Q. 
= 8. 
,/ The facts, which were stipulated, are as follows, Ms McDonough ~ 
/' was robbed. She gave police a description of the robber and of a 
1975 Monte Carlo she had observed near her home just before the rob-
bery. After the robbery, she began getting threatening phone calls 
from a man identifying himself as the robber. Police saw a man who 
S< 
.. 
(l 
g_ 
I. 
i;: 
0 
_, 
S< 
.. 
~ 
met McDonough's description driving a 1975 Monte Carlo in McDonough's g 
neighborhood, By tracing the license plate number, police learned 
that the car was registered in petr's name. 
Ten days after the robbery, the telephone company (Telco), at 
~ 
% 
l;;j 
a: 
:S' p 
t"" 
6' 
police request, installed a pen register at its central offices to re- ~ ~ 
0 
cord the phone numbers of all calls made from the telephone at petr's _, 
residence, (A pen register records only the numbers dialed; it does { 
not reveal the contents of the call, or w~ether the call was completed.) 
.• Police did not get a warrant or court order before having the pen 
register installed, The register subsequently revealed that a call 
was made from petr's residence to McDonough's phone, The police then 
got a warrant to search petr's house; that search turned up 
a notation of McDonough's name and number alongside pe!fr's phone._ 
Petr was arrested and McDonough identified him in a line-up as the rob-
ber. 
At a pre-trial suppression hearing, petr contended that the in-
' 
stallation of a pen register, absent a court order or warrant, was an 
illegal search and seizure in violation of the 4th Amendment. On petr's 
theory, the evidence gained from the pen register (Le.; the fact that pet: 
had called McDonough), andthe evidence gained pursuant to the search 
warrant issued in. part on the basis of the pen register data, had to be 
suppressed. The trial judge denied petr's suppression motion and petr 
was convicted. The Md CtApps granted cert directly to the trial court. 
• 
-2-
II. DECISION BELOW 
The CtApps noted that this Court had reserved decision on the 
applicability of the 4th Amendment to pen re~sters. US v Giordano, ~ 
416 US 505, 553-54 & n.4 (1974)· (LFP diss';-~ng); US v NY Tel Co, 434 i 
US 159, 165 n. 7 (1977). The question whether installation of a registei·§ 
"' 
was a "search" subje_ct to the warrant requirement, therefore, had to be 
answered by resort to basic 4th Amendment principles, as enunciated in 
s, 
~ 
~ 
"' fl 
Katz v US, 389 US 347 (1967). Under Katz, the answer depended on wheth• a. 
a telephone subscriber has a constitutionally protected expectation 
the numbers he dials will remain private. In seeking this answer, 
the CtApps adopted the two-fold test articulated by Justice Harlan in 
"' ~ 
his ~ concurrence: "first, a person [must] have exhibited an actual s, 
l"l 
(subjective) expe~tation of privacy, and second, that expectation [must~: 
.... 
be one that society is prepared to recogniz.e as 1 reasonable.'" 389 us ~ 
at 361. 
The CtApps then applied this two-fold test to the facts of this 
case. As to actual expectations of privacy, the court noted that an 
expectation of privacy normally extends to the content of.a conversa-
tion, rather than to the fact., that a conversation took place or that a 
particular number was dialed. Most phone subscribers, moreover, are 
aware that the Telco routinely.makes records of phone calls. It is 
true, of course, that the Telco usually maintains tool-call records only 
of long-distance calls, not of local ones. Yet most subs.cribers_, the 
court suggested, are unaware of the precise boundaries of their lo-
cal dialing zones, especially when those zones don't coincide with geo-
graphical boundaries. Further, the Telco often keeps records of all 
calls from phones subject to a special rate structure. Hodge v Mountain 
(f States Tel Co, 555 F2d 254, 266 (CA 9 1977) (Hufstedler, J, concurring). 
Although it was difficult to know exactly how much privacy the average 
-3-
with respect to the numbers he dialed, the CtApps 
'f'®f:ts~b$cribers generally possessed a general understanding that 
o;:tre placed through electronic equipment and that spme record of 
.·, those calls was made. 
Secondly, even if subscribers were vaguely aware that the Telco 
did not keep records of local calls, and if they consequently entertained 
some expectation of privacy regardi~g local numbers dialed, this did 
not necessarily mean that society was prepared to recognize that expecta-
tion as "reasonable." All subscribers utilize equipment owned by the 
Telco: in order to complete a call, the subscriber must "convey" the 
number to the Telco's switching equipment. Under these circumstances, 
it would be unreasonable for the subscriber to assume that the fact of 
his call's passing through the network will remain a total secret to 
the Telco, Once it is conceded· that subscribers have no legitimate 
4fl expectation of privacy respecting long-distance calls, moreover, it 
would be bizarre to make the existence of a constitutionally-protected 
privacy interest depend on how the Telco defined its "local call zone" 
or how it organized its billing policy. If the Telco decided to 
drop the flat monthly charge, for example, and to record all calls (local 
and otherwise) for billing purposes, the Telco would effectively exting-
uish subscribers' privacy interest in the numbers dialed, Once it is 
conceded that subscribers have no·privacy inter.est in toll-billing re-
cords, and that the Telco is free to keep whatever billing records it 
chooses, it would be anomalous to say that subscribers have a "legitimatE 
expectation of privacy" in locally-dialed numbers simply because the 
Telco does not currently choose to keep records of them. 
For these reasons, the CtApps concluded that subscribers have no 
"legitimate expectation of privacy" with respect to any numbe.rs they 
dial. The court derived support for this conclusion from three analogoui 
,. 
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The first line consisted of cases like US v White, 
.'14!((1971) (person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
i!te~~~~~-made to informant "wired for sound") and US ,;-Miller, 425 
(bank depositor has ~o legltimate expectation of privacy 
··1~ checks and deposit slips in bank's possession). Just as the speaker 
in White and the depositor in Miller "took the risk" that the third 
party would turn the information over to the Govt, so a subscriber, 
realizing that the numbers he.dials must necessarily be conveyed to the 
Tele~, "takes the risk" that it will in turn hand the information over 
to the police. The second line ·of cases involved mail covers, which 
the CAs generally have approved. In a mail cover, the Govt views in-
formation on the outside of a sealed envelope travelling through the 
mails; the Govt may learn the origin and destination of the envelope, 
,r--------... 
A pen register was( qui=-:J 
. "-·-
but not the contents of the letter itself. 
similai;-: the Govt learns numerical data indicating the destination of 
the call, but nothing whatsoever about the contents of the communication. 
The third line of cases involved beepers, which the CAs again have 
generally upheld. Just as a person has no legitimate expectation of 
privacy as to his location when he is travelling about in public, so 
a subscriber has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers 
he dials into the national telephone network. 
For these reasons, the CtApps concluded that, even if subscribers 
do have some expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial, this ex-
. pectation is not one that society is prepared to recognize as "reason-
able." Congress, in exempting pen registers from Title III of the Omni-
bus Act, obviously expressed the judgment that such devices do not pose 
a threat to privacy of the same dimension as the interception of oral 
communications. As this Court said in NY Tel Co, pen registers are 
regularly used by the Telco, without court order, "for purposes of 
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' operations, detecting fraud, and preventing violations 
·;;li"-,'~nder these circumstances, any expectation of privacy as to 
'u~t~~s dialed over the phone network would be unreasona,ble. 
Three judges dissented. The~ believed that subscribers do have 
an·expectation of privacy in their local calls, and that this expectation 
was objectively "reasonable." First of all, routine Telco activities 
do not include the monitoring of local calls, since most customers pay 
for the basic use of Telco equipment at a flat rate. The overwhelming 
number of calls, moreover, are local calls, The_majority's assertion 
tnat customers are unaware of the boundaries of local-call zones was, 
in the dissent's view, mere speculation: in Md, at any rate, callers 
had to dial the prefix 11111 in order to get out of their local area, 
Secondly, subscribers 1 expectation of privacy was "reasonable." True, 
subscribers necessarily entrust• the numbers they dial to Telco electronic 
equipment, but it cannot be deduced from this that subscribers voluntari-
ly intend to transfer information to the Telco. Subscribers, "by the 
simple act of dialing local numbers, do not reasonably intend to reveal 
information; they merely make use of machinery in particular ways which, 
without police intrusion, would have remained fully private. 11 
The dissent rejected the "analogies" the majority sought to draw 
from other lines of cases. White and Miller, in the dissent's view, 
were inapposite: in those cases, the defendant made a knowing and volun-
tary communication to the third party, and thus truly "assumed a risk." 
The subscriber, by contrast, "does not knowingly and voluntarily reveal 
information to the Telco. The mail cover and beeper cases were likewise 
irrelevant: in those cases, the defendant subjected his letters or his 
person to full public inspection; the subscriber, on the other hand, dial 
phone numbers in the privacy of his home, and "reveals" them only to the 
inanimate switching equipment of the phone company. 
, 
-t>-
III. CONTENTIONS 
>'••h'?,,.-itf/· 
~hrJagrees :·with the court below that the outcome here is governed 
N!'. {ti:~'i .an.d rikewise agrees that ·Just~ce Harlan Is two-pronged inquiry is 
,£0 :be 'applied. Petr simply disagrees with the CtApps as to how the two 
questions are to be answered. 
(1) Did Petr Exhibit an Actual Expectation of Privacy? Petr 
contends that he did: by placing his call to McDonough in the privacy 
of his home, petr evinced an intent to shut out the "uninvited eye or 
ear" just as Katz did by shutting the door to his public phone booth. 
Of course, despite petr's attempt to secure privacy, he necessarily 
revealed the number he.was dialing to the Telco's switching equipment. 
As the dissent below said, however, petr did not thereby betray any 
subjective intent to transfer information to the phone company; indeed, 
(.., since this was a local call, the Telco made no record of it at all. By 
making his call in the privacy of his home, petr took reasonable steps 
to protect the number he dialed from curious members of the public at 
large; by so doing, he manifested a subjective expectation of privacy, 
The fact that the number he dialed was recognized as a pattern of beeps 
or pulses by Telco switching machinery does not suggest that petr's 
subjective expectation of privacy was any less. 
(2) Is Society Prepared to Recognize Petr's Subjective Ex7 
pectation as "Reasonable"? Petr suggests that the answer to this ques 
tion depends on a balancing of "privacy interests" against "effective 
law enforcement interests." On the one hand, the burden on law enforc 
ment should a warrant requirement for pen registers be imposed would 
be slight. Obviously, it takes some time to get a warrant, but it take 
time to get any kind of search or arrest warrant; judging· from then 
ber of pen register cases (~, NY Tel Co) in which the FBI or polic 
did get a court order prior to installation, petr suggests that the t, 
probably s:).ight. On the other hand, the 
at' a warrant requirement would offer privacy interests is 
Petr notes that pen registers can be abused: they may 
--- -'~,J.~ .be .converted into wiretaps by attaching earphones. See Note, 
77 Duke L J 751, 759. Petr cites congressional testimony about abuses 
of wiretaps, and suggests that pen registers can be similarly abused. 
In order to prevent "slippery slope" problems, petr says, a warrant 
should simply b.e ·required for a pen register at the outset. To the 
CtApps' argument that subscribers have no "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" because they entrust the numbers they dial to the Telco, petr 
replies that this reasoning only enhances the expectation of privacy. 
If people had a choice as to whose apparatus they used when 
communicating with others, the choice of the Telco's equipment might 
suggest a voluntary decision to transfer information to a third party. 
(~ But consumers in actuality have no choice--the Telco has a monopoly--
and thus a person's "decision" to reveal a number to the Telco cannot 
be said to evidence a voluntary conveyance of information. 
For these reasons, petr concludes that he had an actual expectation 
of privacy,.that this expectation was objectively "reasonable," and 
that the logging of the numbers he dialed thus constituted a "search." 
Since the search fell within none of the recognized exceptions to the 
warrant requirement, it was presumptively "unreasonable" and hence. 
violative of the 4th Amendment. 
B. Resp. 
Resp begins by emphasizing that a pen register does not intercept 
the content of any communication. As LFP noted in his Giordano dissent, 
a pen register 
is a mechanical device attached to a given telephone line 
and usually installed at a central telephone facility. It 
records on a paper tape all numbers dialed from that line. 
" 
-o-
I 
'It does not identify the telephone numbers from which 
incoming calls originated, nor does it reveal whether any 
call, either incoming or outgoing, was completed. Its 
use does not involve any monitoring of telephone conversa-
tions. 
416 US at 549 n.l. As this Court said in NY Tel Co, moreover, 
Neither the purport of any communication between the caller 
and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether 
the call was even completed is disclosed by pen registers. 
Furthermore, pen registers do not accomplish the "aural 
acquisition" of anything. They decode outgoing telephone 
numbers by responding to changes in electrical voltage 
caused by the turning of the telephone dial (or pressing 
of buttons on push button phones) and present the informa-
tion in a form to be interpreted by sight rather than by 
hearing. 
434 US at 167. The only question in this case, therefore, is whether 
the mere recordation of telephone numbers dialed by a subscriber con-
stitutes a "search and seizure" for 4th Amendment pu:tposes. In answer-
ing this question, resp agrees with petr and the CtApps that the two-
__pronged test from Justice Harlan's Katz concurrence.should be applied. 
(1) Did Petr Exhibit an Actual Expectation of Privacy? Resp 
argues that telephone users in general entertain no real expectation of 
privacy in the numbers they dial: as several CAs have said, people nor-
mally expect privacy as to the contents of their calls, not as to the 
.fact that they have placed a call to a certain number. People realize 
that the number they dial is necessarily communicated to the Telco, not 
only for the purpose of completing the call, but also for billing and 
other business purposes. People likewise realize that records of phone 
calls are kept; for they see lists of the long-distance numbers they've 
; . ~ called on their monthly bills. The fact that the Telco does not usually 
keep records of all calls, resp-argues, is of no constitutional signifi-
cance. The facts that all 'numbers dialed are imparted to the Telco, and 
that all numbers dialed are capable of being recorded by it, are enough 
to negate any reasonable expectation of privacy in the information thus 
divulged. The constitutional irrelevance of any "long distance"/"local" 
' 
1• 
'O 
:l.s underscored when one considers that the signals going 
;J~a local call are transported by the same equipment that handles 
·~~~g-distance calls. This equipment is the necessary conduit of all 
phone calls, and the "intrusion" effected by a pen register on the 
dialer's privacy is identical regardless of what city he is calling. 
Under these circumstances, it would bizarre to hold that the dialer's 
constitutional rights (iepended on what the Telco's zone-definition prac-
tices happened to be. Resp, following the CtApps, relies on White, 
Hoffa, and Miller, emphasizing that the intrusion here is less than in 
those cases, since in those cases the content of the communication was 
at stake. Pen registers, by contrast, do not intercept content at all. 
(2) Is Society Prepared to Recognize Petr's Subjective Expec-
tation (If He Had One) as "Reasonable"? Resp notes that pen registers 
are routinely used for.a variety of purpose;s. The Telco uses thel]l, for 
example, to find out ~hether a home phone is being used to conduct a 
business; to check for defective dials; to ascertain billing errors; 
and to record all calls from phones subject to special rate structures. 
Most importantly, pen registers are routinely used by the Telco to in-
~ vestigate customer complaints about obscene or harassing calls. Forty-
; f l ? 
1'~ ,.J. nine States now have statutes making abusive phone calls a criminal of-r " 
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fense, and soci.ety has recognized that pen registers may legitimately be 
used as devices for detecting the persons responsible for such calls. 
Numerous courts have approved the use of pen registers by the Telco, 
as against "invasion of privacy" challenges, for the purpose of ferreting 
out violators of the law. Society's recognition that the Telco will 
employ pen registers to investigate customer complaints--and that, when 
the evidence is gathered, Telco will divulge it to the police--indicates 
that an expectation of privacy in the numbers one dials is unreasonable. 
In this case, of course, the Telco did not install a pen register on petr': 
phone sua sponte, but was requested to do so by police, Yet this differ-
-J.u-
obviously be significant for purposes of "state 
:--, 
.. fiJ~ysis, is really insignificant for purposes of "expectation 
·iYt.efacy" analysis. Once it is accepted that Telco will record numbers 
detect misuse of the phone syste~, it is irrelevant to the dialer whe-
ther Telco is acting on its own or at the Govt 1 s instance. Society has 
recognized that Telco's logging of one's numbers is permissible for any 
number of legitimate purposes--billing, correcting errors, preventing 
abuse. Law enforcement is simply one more such legitimate purpose. 
Given this pervasive pattern of permissible recordation, a telephone 
user cannot reasonably expect that any particular number he dials will 
remain totally private. 
After concluding its Katz analysis, resp replies to petr's sug-
gested "balancing process." Resp argues in limine that the premise of 
petr 1 s argument here is erroneous. This Court has used a "balancing test' 
(. to ascertain what sort of 4th Amendment protection · (a warrant, for 
example, or something less) is appropriate in a given case. The "balanc 
1 
ing test," in other words, assumes that the 4th Amendment is applicable, 
whereas the question here is whether pen registers effect a "search or 
seizure" such that the 4th Amendment comes into play at all. Even as-
suming that some sort of balancing is proper here, moreover, it would 
not, on resp's view, suggest a different result. On the one hand, the 
burden on law enforcement imposed by a warrant requirement would be sub-
stantial: the time necessary to secure a warrant may be considerable, 
and the usefulness of pen registers will be eliminated entirely in 
cases where reasonable suspicion, but no probable cause, exists. On 
the other hand, the privacy interests to be protected are slight, since 
pen registers leave the contents of communications inviolate. Nor is 
there any real possibility that pen registers will be abused, ~. by 
being converted into more insidious devices like wiretaps. Law enforce-
ment officers and phone companies alike know the limits of their authori-
• 
- ........ -
Ill!, and no "slippery slope" from permissible pen regis-
to impermissible wiretaps need be feared. In any event, this 
Court must presume that law enforcement officers will obey the law. It 
could just as plausibly be argued that a warrant to search "X" for "Y" 
could be abused by police desirous of converting it into a "general 
warrant." Yet this possibility is obviously no reason for refusing 
to issue the search warrant in the first place. 
In sum, resp concludes that the installation of a pen register 
effects no "search or seizure" within the meaning of Katz, and that 
the 4th:Amendment's warrant requirement is thus inapplicable. This 
conclusion, on resp's view, is mandated, not only on analysis of people's 
realistic "expectations of privacy" in the numbers they dial, but also 
on policy grounds. 
IV. DISCUSSION . 
For me, this is a very simple case. I believe that the installa-
tion of a pen register does not constitute a "search or seizure" and 
that the decision below should be affirmed. 
A. Actual Expectation of Privacy. The average phone user, 
I would suspect, does not harbour any significant expectation of privacy 
regarding the fact that he has dialed a particular number on his phone. 
All phone users are aware from their monthly bills that the Telco records 
long-distance dialings. Som~ users may infer--from the fact that local 
call_s ___ are generally governed by a flat rate, rather than a per-c~ll rate-
~ that the Telco does not usually record local dialings. Yet I wonder how 
'E 
many subscribers consciously draw this inference: the Telco could have 
any number of reasons for keeping track of local calls too--to .gauge the 
volume of calls over particular circuits, for example, or to get some 
idea of what a fair monthl:y charge would be:. Phone users, in other words 
know for a fact that the Telco records some calls, know for a fact that 
.-
• 
,fe~~o has the facilities for recording all calls, and might well 
,,,:~spect, if forced to think about it, that the Telco may have reasons 
(unrelated to billing, perhaps) for recording local dialings in particula1 
On a common-sense level, it seems hard to imagine that people would 
seriously think that the numbers they dial into a computerized phone 
network will remain a secret from the phone company. 
The fact that petr dialed McDonough 1 s number from his own home 
does not, to my mind, call for any different conclusion. Contrary to 
petr's argument, Katz is quite different from this case. Katz wanted 
to keep the contents of his phone call private, and he reasonably took 
steps toward this end by shutting the doors to his phone booth. Yet 
petr, by the mere act of dialing from home, could not keep the number 
he was dialing "secret" from the phone company--regardless of where petr 
called from, he would have to reveal that number to the phone company 
in precisely the same way. Petr, by calling from home, may well have 
evinced a desire to keep the obscene contents of his calls secret; the 
numbers he dialed are something else again. 
B. "Reasonable" Expectation of Privacy. Even if petr here 
had some expectation that the number he dialed would remain private, I 
doubt that society is prepared to recognize this expectation as reason-
able. Everyone concedes that a person can have no legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the long-distance numbers he dials. The Telco keeps 
routine business records of these numbers, and this Court's cases estab-
lish that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in business 
records furnished to a third party. Everyone concedes, moreover, that 
the Telco in some circumstances does record all dialings from a particula 
residence--to check billing errors, to monitor equipment malfunctions, to 
trace harassment calls--and that the Telco could rec6rd all dialings if 
it chose to. Given this, to make the existence of a constitutionally-
protected privacy interest contingent on the fortuity of a private 
,,, 
ny's billing practices would be most bizarre. It is, after all, 
that we are interpreting. When a person dials a number--
any nuniber--he takes the risk that the Telco will record that number for 
a variety of legitimate business purposes. Having taken that risk, 
. . 
the dialer can claim no reasonable expectation that the number should 
remain his little secret, 
I think this result is consistent with the trend of this Court's 
cases. Viewing the matter broadly, one may suggest that there are two 
types of "surveillance" cases. One group consists of cases involving 
mail covers, visual surveillance, (through binoculars if necessary), 
b"eepers~ and the like. These various "devices" are similar in that 
they take in what might be called the "externals" of people's activity--
their physical location in space, their name and address, the destination 
of their movements and correspondence. These devices, in other words, 
keep track only of that which one must necessarily reveal to others in 
conducting one's affairs. The other group consists of cases involving 
wiretaps of phone calls or opening of letters. Here, where surveillance 
necessi"tates taking in the contents of people's communications, the 
4th Amendment applies and a warrant is necessary. Pen registers, in my 
view, belong quite firmly in the former group. Pen registers, like 
mail covers, beepers, and visual surveillance, take in no content: they 
take in only the facts that the dialer must necessarily· reveal to others 
(here, the phone company) in going about his business. Pen registers 
reach only the "externals" of cornmunication--the bare fact that a number 
has been dialed. Just as one m:yst "reveal" the outside of an envelope 
in order to get it delivered, so one must reveal the number one dials 
in order to get the call completed. To the extent that one necessarily 
discloses certain data for the purpose of using modern methods of cornmuni 
cation, one pro tanto surrenders any "expectation of privacy" as to the 
data necessarily disclosed. 
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Finally, to hold that installation of a pen register is a "search,' 
and thus to hold that such installations are subject to a warrant re-
quirement, would, in my view, _impose a serious burden on law enforce-
ment. It is my understanding that 'pen registers are customarily used 
in the investigative phase of criminal proceedings: pen registers, that 
is,_are used to help get evidence sufficient to make out probable cause 
to arrest or_search. _This was the pattern i~ this case: the police 
had a suspicion of petr, but perhaps not probable cause; they installed 
a pen register, and that produced a key fact--that petr had ca~led 
McDonough. On the strength of that fact (plus earlier evidenc,e) the 
police got a search warrant; that search turned up yet more incrimina-
ting evidence, and the police then had probable cause to arres,t. As 
the investigation in this case reveals, therefore, the police often 
may !!2!, have probable cause at the time they need to install a pen 
regist.er; if a warrant is required for all installations, therefore, 
pen registers will be useless at the early stages of investigations 
where the police have nothing but a strong suspicion. 
V. CONCLUSION 
I conclude that the installation of a pen register is not a search 
for 4th Amendment purposes, and hence that no warrant is requiied prior 
to such installations. Accordingly, the decision of the Md CtApps 
should be aff'd. 
-15-
QUESTIONS 
For petr: 
You have argued that telephon!= users have an "expectation of pri-
vacy" as to the local numbers they dial because the telephone company 
does not normally keep records of local calls. Does not your argument 
mean that the existence vel non of a constitutionally-protected privacy 
interest will depend on the fortuity of a private corporation's bill-
ing policies at any point in time? Does this mode of reasoning strike 
you as odd? 
